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In this paper we estimate the dynamic interactions between option-implied variance and 
skewness in agricultural commodity markets and monetary policy. Using a structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) framework, we find that an expansionary (contractionary) monetary 
policy upwardly (downwardly) revises commodity markets’ expectations about the price and 
volatility path of agricultural products. On the other hand, our empirical analysis reveals that 
monetary policy does not have a systematic and timely response to sudden changes in option 
implied expectations of commodity investors. In addition, we provide empirical evidence 
showing the robust forecasting power of agricultural option-implied information on monetary 
policy with R2 values reaching almost 52%.  
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Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that monetary policy is an important 
determinant of commodity prices (see, for example, Frankel, 1986; Frankel and Rose, 
2010). Frankel (2013) argues that the lax monetary policy of the Fed during the recent 
period (2003-2013) was an important factor that contributed significantly to the rapid 
rise in almost all commodity prices. He provides a subtle economic interpretation of 
the factors that induce the negative statistical relationship between interest rates and 
commodity prices. Low interest rates increase the demand or decrease the supply of 
storable commodities because low interest rates decrease the incentive for extraction 
today versus tomorrow (real options effect), they decrease the cost of carrying 
inventories and lead to a portfolio rebalancing from bonds towards commodity 
markets. 
 
The general consensus in the literature is that an expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy stance is usually associated with high (low) commodity prices. 
Anzuini, Lombardi and Pagano (2013) use a standard VAR analysis and examine the 
impact of US monetary policy shocks on commodity prices. They find that an 
expansionary monetary policy shock increases modestly commodities prices. Gubler 
and Hertweck (2013) provide empirical evidence that an expansionary monetary in US 
induces a persistent increase in commodity prices and Gilbert (2010) shows that 
“agricultural price booms” are better explained by macroeconomic and monetary 
factors instead of commodity-specific factors. Hammoudeh, Nguyen and Sousa (2015) 
find that a contractionary US monetary shock leads to an immediate rise in energy and 
metals prices and to an initial rise which reverses to a fall in agricultural commodity 
prices, implicitly identifying a sectorial inflation monetary policy channel.  
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Gospodinov and Jamali (2013) use commodity futures data and find that US 
expansionary monetary policy surprises tend to increase commodity prices. However, 
they document that the sensitivity to monetary shocks varies significantly across 
different commodity groups. Gordon and Rowenhorst (2006) show that commodities 
is the asset class which acts as the most efficient hedge against both the expected and 
the unexpected component of inflation, and Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) find that 
when inflation expectations are upwardly revised (expansionary monetary policy), 
“investors to protect themselves will shift out of money and into commodities, thus 
driving up current commodity prices”. In addition, we identify in the literature the 
reverse channel of causality, according to which commodity prices are early warning 
signals of changes in monetary policy and of future inflationary pressures (Awokuse 
and Yang, 2003; Bhar and Hamori, 2008; Frankel, 2008; Cody and Mills, 1991; 
Garner, 1989; Gospodinov and Ng, 2013).  
 
In this paper we focus on the effects of monetary policy shocks on agricultural 
commodity markets. Agricultural commodities are homogeneous products which have 
perfect price flexibility and usually overreact to monetary announcements1. Bordo 
(1980) shows that the prices of raw goods (like agricultural commodities) have a much 
quicker response to changes in the money supply compared to the manufactured 
goods. Frankel (1986) gives further theoretical and empirical support of this view by 
stating that “monetary policy has important effects on agricultural commodity prices, 
 
1 The economic reasoning behind choosing agricultural commodities is that agricultural commodity 
prices move faster and have a more instant response to monetary policy shocks compared to the other 
services of manufactured goods and services which are included in the CPI.  Okun (1975) was the first 
who identified the flexibility of raw commodity prices when compared to the relatively ‘sticky’ prices 
of the rest manufacturing goods and services which are included in the CPI. According to Okun (1975), 
the manufacturing goods have sticky prices since they are differentiated products traded in imperfect 
markets while the raw commodities are homogeneous products traded in perfectly competitive markets. 
Because of this perfect price flexibility, agricultural commodity price fluctuations act as a potential 
measure of market’s perception of inflation and monetary expectations. 
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because, though they are flexible, other goods prices are sticky”. Frankel (1986) and 
Saghaian, Reed and Marchant (2002) use the Dornbusch (1976) model and find that 
the highly flexible agricultural commodities ‘overshoot’ in response to monetary 
policy shocks. Robertson and Orden (1990) find that an unanticipated monetary policy 
shock has a significant short-run impact in favor of agricultural commodity prices 
(when compared to the impact on the prices of the manufacturing goods) which 
vanishes in the long-run, while Chambers and Just (1992) find that the lax monetary 
policy has a negative effect on maize, wheat and soybeans prices. Furthermore, 
Frankel (2008) finds that the prices of agricultural and mineral commodities are 
negatively related to the level of short-term real interest rates and identifies the 
expansionary monetary policy as a key factor of the 2006-2008 agricultural and 
mineral commodity market boom. 
 
In this paper we take the current research one step further by linking US monetary 
policy not with commodity prices, but with the option-implied expectations about the 
future distribution of commodity prices. We focus on option implied variance and 
option implied skewness extracted from the maize, wheat and soybeans2 commodity 
derivative market. We use implied variance as an ex-ante measure of investor's 
expectations about the future variance of agricultural commodity prices. However, 
 
2 We choose maize, wheat and soybeans commodity markets in our empirical analysis because these 
agricultural commodities are a sound proxy for agricultural commodity markets in the relevant 
literature. Although many empirical works which focus on commodity markets use a cross section of 
around 12 agricultural commodities (e.g. Daskalaki, Kostakis and Skiadopoulos (2014); Fernandez-
Perez, Fuertes and Miffre (2016)), we include the three most important (in terms of liquidity of their 
respective options and futures markets) which are the maize, wheat and soybeans futures and options 
markets. Maize, wheat and soybeans have the most liquid futures and options market (in both terms of 
trading volume and open interest) compared with the respective derivative markets of the rest 
agricultural commodities. Since we base our empirical analysis to the option-implied expectations, we 
choose these three agricultural commodity because they have the more reliable and liquid futures and 
options market. In addition, a large number of empirical works which focuses on the information 
content of agricultural derivative market uses maize, wheat and soybeans futures and options markets 




investor's expectations extracted from the options market may embed both risk 
aversion and objective expectations about future variance. To address this issue, in the 
empirical analysis we also decompose the implied variance into an objective 
expectation about future variance and a residual called variance risk premium which 
proxies for risk aversion3. Option implied skewness is used as an ex-ante measure 
which quantifies expectations about the future price path of commodity prices. For 
example, Han (2008) finds that in the S&P 500 equity option market implied skewness 
is highly positively correlated with market sentiment. In our empirical analysis we 
view a positive implied skewness as a signal that reveals a bullish market and we 
consider a negative implied skewness as a signal that reveals a bearish commodity 
market.4 
 
Our empirical investigation is motivated by studies that identify the crucial importance 
of the ‘risk taking channel of monetary policy’ (Andrian and Shin (2008), Angeloni, 
Faia and Lo Duca (2015), Borio and Lowe (2002), Bruno and Shin (2015), Bekaert, 
Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), Borio and Zhu (2012), David and Veronesi (2014), 
Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2014), Mishkin and White (2002), Rajan 
(2006)). These empirical works identify the structural linkages between the monetary 
 
3 The respective works on the literature on risk aversion on commodity markets define the Variance 
Risk Premium (VRP) in an individual commodity market as the compensation demanded by a 
representative investor in the respective commodity market in order to bear variance risk (Doran and 
Ronn (2008), Trolle and Schwartz (2010), Prokopczuk, and Simen (2014), Wang, Fausti and Qasmi 
(2012)). In our study the VRP for each individual commodity has the same economic interpretation 
since they represent the time-varying degree of risk aversion of investors and producers in a specific 
commodity market (e.g. maize). Our interpretation of the VRP has the same economic meaning with the 
VRP which is computed for the equity market using the S&P500 index (Carr and Wu (2009), Bekaert, 
Hoerova and Lo Duka (2013)), with the only difference being that our measure is commodity (asset) 
specific and does not refer to the agricultural commodity market as a whole. Unlike the equity market, 
in commodity markets there is not available a traded commodity market index and an option contract 
written on the index. For this reason, it is impossible to construct a widely accepted and reliable 
measure of risk aversion for the agricultural commodity market as a whole. 
4 When option-implied skewness increases, option writers increase the likelihood of future increase in 
the price of the underlying asset (calls are more expensive relative to puts) and vice-versa. For more 
details see Bakhsi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) and Rehman and Vilkov (2012). 
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policy stance and the perception and pricing of risk by financial market participants.  
For example, Bruno and Shin (2015) show the dynamical links between the monetary 
policy stance and the leverage in the banking sector and attribute a large part of this 
leverage effect to fluctuations in credit risk-taking. Angeloni, Faia and Lo Duca (2015) 
find that an expansionary monetary policy results to an increase in the risk taking in 
the banking sector. In addition, Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) and David and 
Veronesi (2014) show that monetary policy shocks have a significant impact on the 
time-varying degree of risk aversion in the equity market. While the relevant empirical 
works verify the existence of a risk taking channel of monetary policy in the equity 
market and in the banking sector, there is no empirical work examining the existence 
of this risk-taking monetary policy channel for commodity markets. Our econometric 
analysis is the first which sheds light on the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
commodity market uncertainty and risk aversion. Our study is methodologically most 
closely related to the work of Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) who study 
structural interdependencies between monetary policy and option-implied measures of 
risk aversion and volatility in the S&P 500 equity option market. In the empirical 
analysis we use a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) framework to search the 
dynamic interactions between expectations about future variance and skewness in 
agricultural commodity markets and monetary policy. The stance of monetary policy 
is proxied by the Fed funds rate or other alternative measures like the real interest rate, 
the short-term US-Treasury Bill and the state of inflation expectations. 5 To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study which examines the dynamic interactions 
between commodity option-implied variance and skewness and monetary policy.  
 
 
5 Bernanke (2007): “Undoubtedly, the state of inflation expectations greatly influences actual inflation 
and thus the central bank’s ability to achieve price stability.” 
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We find that unlike stock markets for which Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and 
Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) find that a lax monetary policy decreases risk 
aversion and option implied variance in the short to medium run (after about 6 
months), in agricultural commodity markets an expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy increases (decreases) implied variance and makes more positive the 
skewness of the risk neutral distribution of agricultural commodity markets in the 
short to medium run (after 4-7 months). In other words, we empirically verify that 
expectations in commodity markets have an opposite reaction to monetary shocks 
compared with those in the stock-market. The economic interpretation behind this 
contrast in stock-market and commodity market reactions to monetary shocks lays in 
the fact that while an expansionary monetary policy (low interest rates) leads to 
increases in equity and commodity market prices, it has an exact opposite effect to the 
volatility of equity and commodity prices. In the equity market, good news about 
prices (a rising stock-market) reduce volatility in the market due to the ‘leverage 
effect’ (Christie (1982)). According to the ‘leverage effect’, a rising the stock-price 
decreases the firms’ leverage and makes the firm less risky, or equivalently, less 
volatile. In commodity markets, the price-volatility correlation turns to positive 
because in commodity markets rising prices result to increasing market turbulence and 
uncertainty about these prices. The mechanics which link prices and the respective 
volatility in commodity markets have their roots in the ‘Theory of Storage (Kaldor 
(1939), Brennan (1958), Telser (1958), Working (1948, 1949), Fama and French 
(1987), Deaton and Laroque (1992), Gordon, Hayashi and Rowenhorst (2013)). 
According to the ‘Theory of Storage’, the decline in inventory levels increases the 
marginal convenience yield for holding physical inventory which results to rising risk 
premia and uncertainty about commodity prices. According to this theory, the 
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inventory level of an individual commodity is inversely related to commodity market 
turbulence which in commodity markets (unlike the stock-market) is translated as the 
contemporaneous upward movement of the respective commodity prices and 
volatility6.  
 
We additionally find that the degree of ‘bullishness’ (option-implied skewness) of 
agricultural markets is more sensitive to monetary shocks compared to implied 
variance. The increased sensitivity of risk neutral skewness might result from the fact 
of the already empirically verified negative correlation between agricultural and 
mineral commodity prices and US short-term interest rates (Frankel (2008), Frankel 
and Rose (2010)). Our results on the significant negative impact of monetary shocks 
on the risk neutral skewness of agricultural markets shows the increased significance 
of monetary shocks on the risk neutral expectations about future commodity prices. 
On the other hand, David and Veronesi (2014) empirically show that the option-
implied expectations about future prices in the stock-market are not significantly 
affected by monetary policy shocks7. While an expansionary monetary policy (a 
negative interest rate shock) has a positive effect in stock-market prices (Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), Rigobon and Sack (2004)) and in commodity prices (Gordon and 
Rowenhorst (2006), Frankel (2008), Frankel and Rose (2010)), we show that the 
 
6 Deaton and Laroque (1992) estimate a storage model and show that the decrease in inventory levels 
(the higher probability of a stock-out in inventories) is associated with rising risk premia, commodity 
prices and expected future spot price volatility in the respective commodity markets. In addition, 
Gordon, Hayashi and Rowenhorst (2013) provide recent empirical evidence in support of the Deaton 
and Laroque (1992) findings according to which the inventory level and the marginal convenience yield 
for holding physical inventory are the key factors behind the contemporaneous and parallel time series 
movements of commodity prices and of the volatility processes of these prices. 
7 David and Veronesi (2014) estimate a bivariate VAR model with the 3-month US Treasury Bill and 
the put/call ratio (the ratio of out-of-the-money put and call option prices) of the S&P 500 option 
contract. The put/call ratio has a similar economic interpretation compared to our risk neutral skewness 
since it quantifies investors’ fears about stock-market declines. They find that the responses of the 




analogous positive effect exists for agricultural commodity expectations about these 
prices, but, according to recent empirical evidence of David and Veronesi (2014), does 
not exist in the stock-market. In simpler words, our empirical analysis is the first to 
show that the management (by the US monetary authority) of market expectations 
about future prices, while being infeasible for the case of the stock-market, becomes 
feasible when dealing with maize, wheat and soybeans market expectations. We 
additionally examine the dynamic interactions between monetary policy and 
commodity investors’ perceptions about tail risk which we quantify by estimating the 
kurtosis of the risk neutral distribution. Our SVAR model shows that, unlike risk 
neutral variance and skewness, the risk neutral kurtosis does not have a significant 
response to monetary policy shocks. 
 
Our main findings do not change when instead of the Fed funds rate we use other 
widely accepted alternative measures of the monetary policy stance, like the real 
interest rate, the 3-month US-Treasury Bill rate and the state of short-term inflation 
expectations. Our empirical analysis reveals that a positive one standard deviation 
shock in implied variance has sometimes a very sluggish effect on monetary policy in 
some of the VAR identification schemes. We do not find any statistically significant 
effects from implied skewness to monetary policy. Overall, our results indicate that 
there is no systematic response of monetary authorities to a sudden change in maize, 
wheat and soybeans market expectations. While the monetary authority reacts to a 
highly risk averse and volatile stock-market by lowering interest rates (see Bekaert, 
Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), David and Veronesi (2014)), we empirically show that 
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the monetary authority does not systematically intervene in order to calm down the 
turbulence and the expectations about an individual agricultural commodity price.8  
 
Furthermore, following the approach of Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), we 
also estimate a multivariate VAR in which we control for business cycles and we 
decompose option-implied variance into economic uncertainty (expected realized 
variance of commodity prices) and a residual called variance risk premium which 
proxies for risk aversion.9 We find that option-implied expectations respond instantly 
(after 2-4 months) to monetary shocks with the responses remaining statistically 
significant for many months after the initial shock. These results show that monetary 
policy is able to affect commodity market expectations irrespective of the phase of the 
business cycle. When we decompose the option-implied variance to its two 
components we find that the risk aversion component has an instant and statistically 
significant positive response to negative monetary policy shocks in maize and 
soybeans markets. In the wheat market the economic uncertainty component instead of 
the risk aversion is more sensitive monetary policy shocks. Our findings implicitly 
reveal that monetary authorities, in addition to being able to affect commodity price 
trends (Bessler, 1984; Frankel and Hardouvelis, 1985; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990; 
Hua, 1998) can also control the (option-implied) expectations of agricultural 
 
8 Our VAR models show that the monetary policy responses to a positive shock to option-implied 
expectations and to risk aversion are sluggish, not persistently negative or positive and in many cases 
statistically insignificant. These empirical results show that monetary authorities do not (at least for the 
time-being) systematically intervene in order to calm down the expectations about an individual 
commodity price. This result is somewhat expected since we do not expect the monetary authority to 
react to changes in an individual commodity market. For this reason, our results are not directly 
comparable to those of David and Veronesi (2014) and Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) since 
they refer to the monetary effects on the option-implied expectations of the stock-market as a whole 
(quantified by using the options contracts on the S&P 500 and the VIX index). 
9 Option-implied variance incorporates both economic uncertainty and risk aversion. Variance Risk 
Premium (VRP) is a more reliable measure of risk aversion, since it represents the compensation 




commodity investors, which is an indirect (but feasible) way to control the actual price 
and volatility path in commodity markets. The latter can be achieved under a flexible 
inflation targeting regime which allows the short-term targeting of other variables 
besides inflation. 10  Under this approach, we argue that the targeting of the option-
implied expectations of agricultural commodity markets will implicitly lead to less 
uncertainty and turbulence in these markets, which, ultimately, will result to a more 
stable inflation and production process (since the agricultural products are significant 
components of the Consumer Price Index and of the Industrial Production Index). The 
main policy implication behind our empirical findings is that the short-term targeting 
of the option-implied expectations of commodity markets can be an implicit short-
term target by the central bank in order to achieve its primary goals which is output 
and inflation stability.  
 
In the last part of the empirical analysis we examine if agricultural option implied 
variance and skewness are robust predictors of the future monetary policy stance. We 
find a negative and statistically significant relationship between option-implied 
variance and skewness and future (from one month up to two years) monetary policy 
stance.  Our results remain robust when we control for macroeconomic fundamentals, 
for expectations in stock market volatility (VIX), for the persistence of monetary 
policy stance and for the zero lower bound environment. We additionally find that the 
option-implied expectations are robust predictors of alternative measure of monetary 
 
10 Under a flexible inflation targeting regime, the monetary authority incorporates a concern for output 
stability while having the long-term inflation stability as primary long-term target. In addition, many 
researchers in the field state that the central bankers can better achieve their primary macroeconomic 
objectives (of inflation and output stabilization) when targeting other variables which are linked with 
financial stability like asset prices and credit growth (Borio and Lowe (2002), Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro 
and Saurina (2014)). Bernanke and Gertler (1999) mention that “the main advantage of flexible 
inflation targeting is that it provides a unified framework both for making monetary policy in normal 
times, and for preventing and ameliorating the effects of financial crises.” 
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policy stance, like inflation expectations, the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate and the 
short-term real interest rate. The predictive regressions employed in the empirical 
analysis do not suffer from endogeneity problems. The forecasting power of implied 
variance and skewness is not a consequence of the Feds systematic response to 
changes in expectations of option commodity market participants, since there exists no 
empirical evidence supporting the latter. The SVAR analysis reveals a sluggish, non-
systematic (not always negative) and in many cases statistically insignificant response 
of monetary policy to shocks in option-implied variance and skewness. Following the 
results and the claims of Woodford (1994) according to which only the non-standard 
indicators of monetary policy are the ones who can be used for monetary policy 
forecasting11, we conclude that agricultural commodity option markets are able to give 
valuable information about the future path of monetary policy. The reason behind this 
option-implied macroeconomic informational content lies in the contemporaneous 
linkages between interest rates and real agricultural commodity prices (Calvo (2008), 
Frankel, 2008; Frankel and Rose, 2010; Frankel, 2013) according to which low real 
interest rates (lax monetary policy) lead to high real agricultural commodity prices. 
When for example commodity option writers (correctly) anticipate an upward trend in 
future interest rates, they give higher probability to a fall in commodity prices instead 
 
11 Woodford (1994) claims that the ability of monetary policy indicators to “signal the underlying 
sources of inflationary pressures that one wants to respond to may be impaired by the very fact that the 
monetary authority responds to it”. Woodford (1994) states that the predictive ability and increased 
significance of the nontraditional monetary policy indicators like the commodity prices, lies in the fact 
that these indicators are not causal determinants of monetary policy and inflation, but they are strongly 
affected by monetary policy and inflation expectations, and hence, they correctly anticipate and signal 
their future state. According to Woodford (1994), the absence of causal relationships in the forecasting 
regressions on monetary policy is the key behind choosing the appropriate indicators. This is the case 
for our risk neutral moments, since, they are strongly affected by monetary policy shocks and the 
relationship between risk neutral moments and the subsequent monetary policy stance is not causal, 
since the option-implied expectations in commodity markets are not a monetary policy target. Our 
SVAR analysis reveals the same information, since we find that the monetary authority does not 
respond to changes in risk neutral variance and skewness of agricultural commodity markets. Thus, the 
risk neutral variance and skewness of agricultural markets can be used as nonstandard (and hence 
useful) indicators of the future state of the monetary policy stance.  
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of rise, a fact which makes more negative the skewness of option-implied risk neutral 
distributions.  
 
The policy implication behind the significant forecasting performance of risk neutral 
variance and skewness is that the option-implied expectations of agricultural 
commodity markets can be useful monetary policy tools not only under a flexible 
inflation targeting regime, but also under a strict (or ‘inflation forecast”) targeting 
regime which fully concentrates on the targeting of inflation expectations12. According 
to this approach, the monetary authority can implicitly control inflation expectations 
by responding to changes in option-implied expectations of commodity markets, since 
these expectations have an instant response to monetary shocks and they are robust 
indicators of inflation expectations. In conclusion, under both strict and flexible 
inflation targeting framework, we argue that the central bank has always an incentive 
to use as monetary policy indicators the option-implied expectations of commodity 
markets since, besides implicitly leading to a stable inflation and production process 
(under a flexible inflation targeting regime), they are statistically significant predictors 
of expected inflation whose stability is the only objective of the central bank under a 
strict inflation targeting regime. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
analytical methodology for computing model-free option-implied variance and 
 
12 Under a strict inflation targeting regime (or “inflation forecast targeting”), the monetary authority 
should not respond to changes in asset prices. Under the strict inflation targeting, the central bank has 
the inflation forecast as the primary target (and puts zero weight on output stabilization). The empirical 
work of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) shows that the strict and aggressive inflation targeting framework 
achieves better output and inflation stabilization “when asset prices are volatile, whether the volatility is 
due to bubbles or to technological shocks; and that, given an aggressive response to inflation, there is no 
additional benefit to responding to asset prices”. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999), the 
monetary authority should respond to changes in asset prices only when these changes are early warning 




skewness and we describe the data. In Section 3 we present some descriptive statistics 
and we analyze the results of our SVAR models and the results of our predictive 
regressions of implied variance and skewness on monetary policy. Section 4 provides 
various robustness to our empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and presents 
some policy implications and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1 Model-Free Option-Implied Variance and Skewness 
We compute the model-free version of option implied variance and skewness using the 
method of Bakhsi, Kapadia and Madan (2003). Under the risk-neutral probability 
measure Q, the analytical formulas for conditional risk neutral moments are given in 
the equations (1), (2) and (3) below: 
 
                                                      
2 2(R ) (R)][Q Qt tVAR E E= −                                      (1) 
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In accordance with Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan (2003), the “Quad”, “Cubic” and 
“Quart” are hypothetical contracts which represent the expected (under the risk 
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neutral probability measure (Q)) discounted quadratic, cubic and quartic returns of the 
futures contracts and they are given in equations (4) to (6) below 13 : 
 
                                                   ( ) 2( )r T t QtQuad e E R
− −=                                              (4) 
                                                 ( ) 3( )r T t QtCubic e E R
− −=                                                (5) 
                                                         ( ) 4( )r T t QtQuart e E R
− −=                                                            (6) 
 
In the equations (4) and (5) and (6), r is the risk-free interest rate (3-month US-
Treasury Bill), 𝑡 is the trading date and T  is the expiration date of a given contract and 
consequently  T t−  defines time to maturity. Solving for the quadratic risk neutral 
expected returns (Et
Q(R2)), the cubic risk neutral expected returns (Et
Q(R3)) and quartic 
risk neutral expected returns (Et
Q(R4)) given in equations (4), (5) and (6) and replacing 
these quantities into equations (1), (2) and (3), we get the model-free version of option 
implied variance (IV), implied skewness (IS) and implied kurtosis (IK) as a function 
of Quad, Cubic and Quart contracts and risk neutral expected returns ( ( )QtE R ): 
 
       
( ) 2][ ( )r T t QtIV e Quad E R
−= −
                                  (7) 
 
  
( ) 3( )
3/2
( ) ( )3 2[ ]
r T tr T t Q Q






                             (8) 
 
 
13 If we define with R the logarithmic returns of the underlying asset with price St [R=ln ((St+1/ln(St))], 
then a Quad (or volatility) contract is a theoretical contract with risk neutral quadratic expected return  
EtQ(R2), a Cubic contract is a contract with risk neutral cubic expected return  EtQ(R3) and a Quart 
contract is a contract with risk neutral quartic expected return  EtQ(R4).  Bakhsi, Kapadia and Madan 
(2003) prove that quadratic, cubic and quartic expected risk neutral returns are continuous functions of 
out of the money (OTM) call and put option prices.   
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Furthermore, Bakhsi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) show that under the risk-neutral 
pricing measure Q, the “Quad”, “Cubic” and “Quart” contracts can be expressed as 
continuous  functions of out-of-the-money European calls C( , , )t T K  and out-of-the-
money European puts ( , , )P t T K  in the form given below : 
 
( ) ( )2 2
0
2 1 ln 2 1 ln
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Where K  is the strike price of the option contract, F is the price of the underlying 
futures contract, t  is the trading date and T is the expiration date of the option 
contract. In addition, Bakhsi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) prove that the expected 
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Knowing the analytical forms of “Quad” and “Cubic” and “Quart” contracts from 
equations (10), (11) and (12), and the approximating quantity of conditional risk 
neutral expected returns ( )QtE R  from equation (13), we can compute by using 
numerical integration the model-free implied variance (IV), implied skewness (IS) and 
implied kurtosis (IK) which are given in equations (7), (8) and (9) respectively. 
 
2.2 Commodity Futures and Options Data 
We obtain end-of-month option and futures data for maize, wheat and soybeans from 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The options and futures data for maize, wheat 
and soybeans cover the period from January 1990 to December 2011. From our data 
sample we eliminate call and put options prices with moneyness level less than 80%
( / 0.8)K F   and call options with moneyness level greater than 120% ( / 1.2)K F  . 
Thus, the [0.8 1.2] moneyness band corresponds to our time series dataset of out of the 
money (OTM) call and put commodity option prices14. We then use the Black (1976) 
model in order to compute implied volatilities for our selected option contracts. 
Following Jiang and Tian (2005) and Chang, Christoffersen, Jacobs and Vainberg 
(2012), we use the cubic spline method in order to interpolate-extrapolate these 
implied volatilities for each maturity across all the selected moneyness levels. We 
construct a fine grid of 1001 moneyness levels with a band ranging between 50% and 
300%, and for these moneyness levels we create a (corresponding) grid of 1001 
 
14 The out-of-the-money (OTM) call option contracts are those with moneyness level larger than 100% 
(𝐾/𝐹>1) and the OTM put options those with moneyness level smaller than 100% (𝐾/𝐹 <1). 
Consequently, the [0.8 1] moneyness band corresponds to the OTM put option prices and the [1 1.2] 




implied volatilities. In order to get more reliable information from the grid of 1001 the 
moneyness -implied volatility pairs, we do not make any interpolation - extrapolation 
when the number of options for a given trading day and a given maturity date is less 
than four. 
 
Using the Black (1976) formula for commodity option prices, we convert these 1001 
implied volatilities into option prices. We use numerical trapezoidal integration to 
compute the Quad, Cubic and Quart contracts in (10), (11) and (12) and to compute 
expected conditional risk neutral returns in (13). We then use the prices of Quad and 
Cubic and Quart contracts and the conditional risk neutral returns ( )QtE R , in order to 
compute IV, IS and IK in (7), (8) and (9). Following Wang, Fausti and Quasmi (2012), 
we construct the constant two-month (60-day) model-free implied variance and 
skewness time series using the following linear interpolation formula: 
 
                                    2 60 60 1 36560 1 1 2 2
2 1 2 1 60
T T T T T
IV T IV T IV
T T T T T
 − −
= +  
− − 
                              (14) 
 
Where 1IV  is the option-implied variance with maturity closest to 60 days, but less than 
60 days, and 2IV  is the option-implied variance with maturity closest to 60 days but 
more than or equal to 60 days. 1T  and 2T are time to expiration for 1IV and 2IV , with 
1 60T   and 2 60T  . 365T  and 60T are the 365 and 60 day intervals respectively. We 
follow the same interpolation method for the construction of the model free option- 
implied skewness. 
We also compute the 2-month realized variance of maize, wheat and soybean futures 
prices. The maturity of commodity futures has to be the same with commodity options 
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written on them. If the nearby contract has less than 60 days to expiration, we replace 
it with the next deferred contract which always has more than (or equal to) 60 days to 
expiration, since expiration dates on commodity futures are 1st of March, May, July, 
September and December. Thus, we choose commodity futures which have 
approximately a constant 2-month maturity.  Following the methodology of Wang, 
Fausti and Qasmi (2012), we calculate the realized variance using daily closing prices 
of the nearby futures contract to get the best possible approximation of a fixed 
maturity of 60 days, according to the equation (15) below15: 
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                                     (15) 
 
Where Ft is the commodity futures price the trading day t and the time interval (t,T) is 
the number of trading days during each monthly period. RVt,T is our estimated realized 
variance for the each monthly period. 
 
2.3 Macroeconomic and Stock Market Data 
We obtain monthly data for the Consumer Price Index (CPI), US unemployment rate, 
real wages, Industrial Production Index (IPI) and the Fed fund rate (FFR) from Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. We obtain monthly short-term (with 1 year horizon) 
inflation expectations data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. We construct 
the time series for the short-term real interest rate as the Fed funds rate minus the rate 
 
15 In the financial econometrics literature the realized variance (RV) is usually defined as the best 
discrete time estimator of the quadratic return variation (QV) which is equal to the sum of the quadratic 
realized returns (Carr and Wu (2009)) for a given time period. This kind of estimation is usually applied 
when dealing with high-frequency intraday data for which the sum of quadratic returns converges more 
efficiently to the integrated quadratic return variation process (Barndorff-Nielsen and Sheppard (2002)). 
In our case, in which we deal with daily data, we choose the more appropriate methodology of 
measuring the realized variance as the monthly variance of daily commodity futures returns for the 
given month, as shown in equation (15). 
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of inflation. Short-term (3-month) US Treasury-Bill data are downloaded from 
DataStream. We construct monthly overlapping data of 2-month growth of Industrial 
Production Index, real wages and CPI. All macroeconomic data have monthly 
frequencies and cover the period from January 1990 through December 2011. We 
obtain end-of-month data for the VIX index from Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE). The VIX index has a fixed maturity of 30 days and it is constructed by using 
the cross section of out-of-the-money call and put options on the S&P 500 index. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the realized variance (RV), implied 
variance (IV) and implied skewness (IS) in the maize, wheat and soybean market. 
Wheat has the highest average realized and implied variance and soybean has the 
highest average implied skewness. Maize is on average the most negatively skewed. 
Table 1 also presents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Philips-Perron (PP) 
test statistics. In each test the null hypothesis is that the time series variable has a unit 
root. The hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all variables under consideration. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the Fed funds rate and the option-
implied variance and skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans markets. From table 2 
we observe that the risk neutral variance and skewness are highly positively 
correlated. The high degree of correlation between the risk neutral variance and 
21 
 
skewness of different agricultural markets combined with the negative correlation 
coefficients between risk neutral variance and skewness and the Fed funds rate is a 
first empirical sign indicating that the factors which drive the dynamics in the option-
implied expectations in these market, are common, and most probably, associated with 
monetary policy and inflation expectations. The synchronous rises in commodity 
market expectations are the first empirical evidence showing that a common 
macroeconomic factor hides behind their common dynamics. These results are line 
with the empirical findings of Frankel (2008) and Frankel and Rose (2010) who 
empirically show that the lax monetary policy environment of the post 2000 period 
decade must be the most influential and common macroeconomic factor behind the 
2000-2008 commodity market boom. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Figure 1 plots the contemporaneous movements in the time series of the Fed fund rate 
and the implied skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans market during the period 
under investigation (1990-2011) and Figure 2 plot the contemporaneous movements 
between implied variance and the Fed fund rate. From Figures 1 and 2 we observe that 
a low (high) level of the Fed fund rate is associated with a high (low) implied 
skewness and high (low) implied variance. We additionally observe that after 2002 
implied skewness turns from negative to positive in all three commodities under 
investigation, with the Fed fund rate reaching very low levels during the same period 
(monetary easing era). Overall, from figures 1 and 2 we see that time series dynamics 
and the monetary reactions of the option-implied expectations in agricultural markets 
are quite similar in terms of timing and magnitude. 
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[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
3.2 Granger Causality  
We begin our econometric analysis with the results from Granger causality tests 
between monetary policy and option implied variance and skewness. The test is 
conducted with unrestricted bivariate VAR models which contain as endogenous 
variables the monetary policy stance and the option-implied variance or skewness of 
agricultural commodity markets. More specifically, we estimate a VAR of the form 
[  ]t t tY FFR IV=  or  [  ]t t tY FFR IS= , where FFR is the monthly Fed funds rate and 
represents the monetary policy stance, IV is the monthly option-implied variance from 
maize, wheat or the soybeans markets and IS is the implied skewness from maize, 
wheat or soybeans markets. The results are reported in Table (3).  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Granger causality tests in Table 3 indicate that the Fed fund rate causes the implied 
skewness in all markets under consideration (maize, grain and soybeans) while the 
reverse effect is insignificant. The Fed fund rate causes the implied variance in the 
maize markets, and the implied variance in all markets has a significant effect on the 
Fed funds rate. These preliminary tests indicate a significant directional effect from 
monetary policy to implied skewness and some mixed bi-directional effects in the case 





3.3 Structural VARs 
We follow the approach of Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) and we estimate 
structural bivariate VAR models of the form [  ]t t tY FFR IV= , or [FFR  IS ]t t tY = . In 
the VAR specification we place monetary policy first and implied variance or implied 
skewness second in order to capture the fact that monetary authorities respond more 
sluggishly to market-oriented shocks while on the other hand, asset markets in general 
are more sensitive to monetary shocks. We run our bivariate SVARs using long-run 
and short-run restrictions. For an N variable VAR, we need N(N-1)/2 restrictions in 
order to be identified. Thus, for our bivariate SVARs, it is necessary to impose 1 
restriction for their exact identification. 
 
Short-run restriction 
We run bivariate SVARs using a short-run restriction, according to which expectations 
about future volatility or skewness in commodity markets do not have a 
contemporaneous (short-run) effect in monetary policy. In other words, we assume 
that monetary authorities have a sluggish response to changes in option-implied 
expectations of commodity markets (The empirical evidence we provide later are in 
favor of this argument-assumption). The bivariate SVAR with the short-run restriction 
is the following: 
 
    
0 1t t tBY AY −= + +      (16) 
 
tY  is the matrix with the variables [  ]t t tY FFR IV=  or [FFR  IS ]t t tY = , 0  is a 2x1 
vector with constants 0 01 02( [  ])  = , is a 2x2 full-rank matrix which determines the 
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endogeneity of the variables in our system and t is the matrix with the independent 
structural shocks in our system (𝐸(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡
′ ) = 𝛪). Lastly, A is the 2x2 short-run 
(feedback) response matrix in which we impose the short-run restriction according to 
which implied variance or implied skewness do not have a short-run effect on 
monetary policy. Our short-run restriction on the feedback matrix A is the following: 
 











      (17) 
Long-run restriction 
Our long-run restriction has to do with the relevant literature on money neutrality (see 
Barro (1977), Barro (1978), Lucas (1972), Lucas (1976), Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998)). We restrict monetary policy to have a zero effect on option-implied 
expectations in the long-run.16 Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) in their SVAR 
model make an analogous hypothesis-restriction about the zero long-run effects of 
monetary policy on the stock-market. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), the 
SVAR model with the long-run restriction has the following long-run response matrix: 
 
    ( )
1
1 1C I B A B
−
− −= −                  (18) 
 
Matrices A and B are already described in equation (16). We assume that monetary 
policy does not affect option-implied expectations in the long-run by placing the long-
run restriction 21( 0)c = in the long-run response matrix C of the structural VAR of 
equation (16) of our bivariate SVAR as follows: 
 
16 According to Barro (1977, 1978) and Lucas (1972, 1976) money cannot affect real variables in the 
long-run because only unanticipated monetary shocks matter for the real economy. In the long-run, 
every change in monetary policy becomes anticipated by market participants.  
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      (19) 
The coefficient 21 0c =  restricts monetary policy to have zero effect on implied variance 
and skewness in the long-run. Additionally, we choose the optimal lag-length of our 
bivariate VARs by following the Akaike lag-length selection criterion17.  
 
We base our results on reduced and structural-form Impulse response functions (IRFs 
and SIRFs respectively thereafter) for which we compute the 95% Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals based on 1000 replications. We also estimate the IRFs from the 
unrestricted (reduced-form) bivariate VAR model. The results are reported in Table 4. 
Panel A reports the results from bivariate structural and reduced-form VARs with 
endogenous variables the Fed funds rate (FFR) and the implied variance (IV) and 
Panel B the results with the Fed funds rate (FFR) and implied skewness (IS). We 
present how many months the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) generated by a 
negative one standard deviation shock in FFR or a positive one standard deviation 
shock in IV/IS remain statistically significant within the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 3 plots the graphs of the IRFs for the case of FFR and IV (IV is measured in 
percentages) and Figure 4 plots the graphs of the IRFs for the case of FFR and IS.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 
 
17 When we choose the lag-length using the Schwarz (SBIC) criterion we obtain similar conclusions as 
those we present when using the Akaike criterion. The Schwarz criterion, compared to the Akaike 
criterion selects more parsimonious VARs. 
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Several interesting conclusions emerge from observing the results regarding the 
empirical behavior of IRFs. Table 4 shows that a negative monetary shock has a 
significant positive effect in IV and IS in all markets considered (maize, wheat and 
soybeans). Both IV and IS display a fast response (after 4-8 months) to monetary 
policy shocks. Monetary policy shocks have a more long lasting impact on implied 
skewness compared to the impact on implied variance.  
 
From Figure 3 we observe that a negative shock in the Fed funds rate (in the model 
with the short-run restriction) increases the implied variance of maize markets about 
54.2 basis points after 7 months, increases the implied variance of wheat markets by 
41.2 basis points after 3 months and increases implied variance of soybeans markets 
by 43.2 basis points after 7 months. These responses remain positive and statistically 
significant for many months after the initial monetary shock. For example, the IRFs of 
maize implied variance to a negative monetary shock remain statistically significant 
for 17 months (from the 8th month till the 25th month after the initial monetary shock) 
in the reduced form VAR, for 2 months (from the 8th month till the 10th month) in the 
SVAR with short-run restrictions and 15 months (from the 10th month till the 25th 
month) in the SVAR with long-run restrictions. 
Implied skewness has also an almost immediate and persistent response to monetary 
policy shocks under all our VAR identification schemes. For example, from Figure 4 
we see that a negative shock in the Fed fund rate increases the implied skewness of 
soybeans markets by 0.062 after 6 months. From Table 4 we see that this effect 
remains statistically significant from lag 6 up and till lag 32 in the model with the 
short-run restriction, and from lags 6-10 and 18-34 in the model with the long-run 
restriction. In addition, we estimate the structural-form Impulse Response Functions 
27 
 
(SIRFs) of the bivariate SVAR models. Figure 5 plots the graphs of the SIRFs for FFR 
and IV and Figure 6 plots the graphs of the SIRFs between FFR and IS. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
 
From figures 5 and 6 we observe that the SIRFs give nearly identical responses with 
the reduced-form IRFs of our bivariate SVAR models. Our basic conclusions remain 
unchanged when we estimate SIRFs instead of the IRFs which are shown in figures 3 
and 4. Overall, our SVAR analysis reveals that the monetary policy effects on the 
bullishness (implied skewness) of maize and wheat markets are much more intensive 
and long-lasting compared to the monetary effects on implied variance. Our results 
indicate that the impact of monetary shocks on implied skewness is much greater 
compared to the impact on implied variance. In all the commodity markets we 
investigate and in all of our VAR identification schemes, implied skewness is being 
increased by a great amount in response to sudden shifts in monetary policy. This 
means that monetary authorities have the ability (under a flexible inflation targeting 
regime (see Bernanke and Gertler (1999)) to turn commodity option markets from 
bearish to bullish and vice-versa. In the section with the robustness tests we provide 
some additional empirical results which strengthen furthermore our claims about the 
ability of monetary authorities to turn commodity markets from bearish to bullish and 
vice-versa.  
 
Our results are exactly opposite of those obtained by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and 
Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) for the stock-market since they find that an 
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expansionary monetary policy reduces uncertainty in equity markets. The economic 
interpretation behind this contradiction is that while in equity markets volatility and 
prices are negatively correlated (leverage effect), in commodity markets (and 
especially the storable ones), volatility and prices are positively correlated. As a result, 
an expansionary monetary policy (low interest rates) while raising equity and 
commodity market prices it does exactly the opposite to the volatility (risk) of these 
prices due to the opposite sign in the volatility-price correlation in the former ones 
compared to the latter ones. Thus, commodity investors revise upwards their 
expectations about volatility risk after observing a negative interest rate shock 
(expansionary policy), while equity investors revise downwards their expectations 
about volatility risk after observing the same shock. When studying the reverse 
channel of causality, we find that the responses of the Fed funds rate to positive 
variance shocks are sluggish and in most cases statistically insignificant. For example, 
for Table 3 we see that the monetary authority response is statistically significant 19 
months after the initial shock in the best case. This fact implicitly reveals that 
monetary authorities, despite they systematically intervene in order to calm down 
equity markets by lowering interest rates, do not react in a systematic manner to a 
nervous and turbulent agricultural commodity market like the maize, wheat and 
soybeans market. In addition, in order to control for the dynamic interactions between 
risk neutral variance and skewness, we run a multivariate SVAR model in which we 
include the Fed funds rate, the risk neutral variance and the risk neutral skewness as 
endogenous variables. Our multivariate SVAR model is the following: 
 
                                                           





tX is the matrix with variables [   ]t t t tX FFR IV IS= , 0  is a 3x1 vector with 
constants
0 01 02 03( [  δ  δ ]) = ,  is a 3x3 full-rank matrix which determines the 
endogeneity of the variables in our system and t is the matrix with the independent 
structural shocks in our system (𝐸(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡
′ ) = 𝛪). Our short run restrictions are based on 
the same economic arguments and assumptions of long-run money neutrality which 
used for our bi-variate SVAR model presented in equations. In order for a 3-factor 
SVAR to be exactly identified, we need to impose three restrictions. Thus, we again 
restrict monetary policy to have a zero long-run effect on risk neutral variance and risk 
neutral skewness, and we additionally assume that the monetary authority does not 
have a systematic short-term response to changes in risk neutral option-implied 
expectations of agricultural commodity markets. We impose one additional restriction 
according to which there are positive spillovers of equal magnitude from risk neutral 
variance to risk neutral skewness (the dynamic responses of variance shocks to risk 
neutral skewness is of the same sign and magnitude-this assumption is in line with the 
“Theory of Storage” (Brennan (1958), Telser (1958), Deaton and Laroque (1992)), 
according to which uncertainty and prices are positively correlated and to our 
empirical evidence (see table 2) which shows that the risk neutral variance and 
skewness time series processes are highly positively correlated. Our short-run 
feedback response matrix S is given below: 
 


















Our long-run feedback matrix L which is used for the model with the long-run 
restrictions (and its derivation is already described in equations (16) and (18)) is given 
below: 
 














                                                                  (22) 
 
The Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of our multivariate SVAR model (and of the 
respective reduce-form VAR model with the same VAR ordering in the endogenous 
variables) between monetary policy, risk neutral variance and risk neutral skewness 
are given in table 5.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
From table 5 we observe that our basic results and conclusions remain unaltered when 
we control for the dynamic interactions between risk neutral variance and skewness in 
our 3-factor SVAR model. The risk neutral variance and skewness have a statistically 
significant response to a negative shock in the Fed funds rate (expansionary monetary 
policy) with the responses of the risk neutral skewness being more instant and 
significantly negative compared to those of the risk neutral variance.  
We also estimate a multivariate VAR model in which we control for the business 
cycles. More specifically, our VAR ordering is the following: 
 




We continue to place macroeconomic variables first and commodity market variables 
last in our VAR ordering selection due to the more sluggish response of the former 
compared to the latter ones. FFR is again the Fed funds rate, IPI is the growth in 
industrial production index, IV is the implied variance and IS is the implied skewness. 
We choose our lag-length in each of our multivariate VAR models using again the 
Akaike criterion. According to the Akaike criterion, the 4-factor VAR for maize has 
13 lags, the VAR model for wheat has 6 lags and the model for the soybeans has 4 
lags. Our multivariable reduced-form VAR model is the following: 
 
                 0 1t t tZ KZ D −= + +                      (21) 
 
Where K denotes B-1A and D denotes A-1 (A is the short-run feedback matrix of the 
structural VAR, according to equations (11) and (12)).  
We base again our analysis on the structural form IRFs for the multivariable 4-factor 
reduced form VAR models for which we estimate the Bootstrapped standard errors 
using 1000 repetitions. Table 6 reports the months for which the IRFs between the 
monetary policy (Fed funds rate) and the option-implied expectations are statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
From Table 6 we see that our results remain robust to the inclusion of business cycles 
variables since implied skewness and variance respond instantly to monetary policy 
shocks with the responses being statistically significant. In more detail, we can see that 
the option-implied skewness responds instantly (after 4-5 months in all commodity 
markets under investigation) to an expansionary monetary policy shock. Table 4 also 
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shows that in all markets considered there is some sluggish response of monetary 
policy to implied variance shocks. We do not find any statistically significant 
responses of monetary policy to shocks-sudden shifts in the expectations of 
commodity investors embedded in implied skewness. This fact strengthens 
furthermore our initial claims according to which the monetary authority (unlike what 
it does in times of stock-market turbulence-see Ribobon and Sack (2003)) does not 
show any intention to manage the expectations in these markets.  
 
Lastly, we examine the dynamic interactions between monetary policy and commodity 
investors’ expectations about extreme (tail) risk in agricultural commodity prices. In 
order to quantify the investors’ expectations about tail risk we compute the kurtosis of 
the risk neutral distribution of agricultural commodity markets. In order to examine 
the dynamic interactions between investors’ crash-o-phobia and monetary policy, we 
estimate a bivariate SVAR model of the form which is described in equations (16) to 
(19), in which we include the Fed funds rate and the option-implied risk neutral 
kurtosis (IK) as endogenous variables. We base again our analysis on the Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs) which are statistically significant. Table 7 reports the 
relevant results. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results of table 7 show that the risk neutral kurtosis (unlike the risk neutral 
variance and skewness) has a sluggish and negative response to negative shocks in the 
Fed funds rate. More specifically, we find that the risk neutral kurtosis (IK) of maize 
and soybeans markets has a sluggish and negative response in the SVAR model with 
the short-run restriction and a positive response in the SVAR model with the long-run 
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restriction. In general, the sluggish and opposite reaction of risk neutral kurtosis of 
agricultural markets to shocks in the Fed funds rate leads us the conclusion that 
commodity investors’ expectations about tail risk are not being significantly affected 
by shifts in monetary policy.  
 
3.4 Forecasting monetary policy with option-implied moments  
In this section we examine the predictive power of option-implied expectations on 
monetary policy. We provide empirical evidence showing that option-implied variance 
and skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans markets are robust predictors of the 
monetary policy stance. Table 8 shows the results of our predictive regressions when 
we regress the Fed funds rate on lagged values of option-implied variance and 
skewness, with the forecasting horizon ranging from 1 month up to 24 months ahead. 
Table 9 shows the results of our predictive regressions when we use implied variance 
and skewness and control for macroeconomic and stock-market factors in order to 
forecast the monthly Fed funds rate. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
From Tables 8 and 9 we see that implied variance and skewness are robust predictors 
of the monetary policy stance. Implied skewness and implied variance have the 
highest predicative power in the wheat market with an R2=45% for a 6-month 
forecasting horizon. For the 6-month forecasting horizon in the soybeans market the 
R2=36% and in the maize market the R2=29%. Even when we control for 
macroeconomic fundamentals like the inflation rate and the term spread (slope of the 
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yield curve) the statistical results remain robust. We find R2 values as high as 45% (6-
month forecasting horizon) when we regress wheat implied variance and skewness on 
the Fed funds rate. The R2 values remain high when we use maize or soybeans implied 
variance and skewness as predictors of the Fed fund rate. Implied variance and 
skewness coefficients are all negative and statistically significant. These results are in 
line with those of David and Veronesi (2014) who find that in equity markets, the 
put/call ratio (a variable which also measures the degree of bullishness in option 
markets) of At-The-Money (ATM) index options has a sustained impact and a robust 
forecasting power on future monetary policy, since it can forecast the path of the 
short-term US-Treasury Bill for up to eight quarters. Our results may look alike with 
those of David and Veronesi (2014), but this happens for structurally different reasons. 
While the Fed systematically reacts to “periods of high VIX levels” (Bekaert, Hoerova 
and Lo Duca (2013)), we neither find (in the relevant literature) nor provide empirical 
evidence showing the same for commodity markets. In contrast, our empirical analysis 
shows that the Fed does not react systematically to periods of increased uncertainty 
and bullishness in commodity markets and that the implied skewness (bullishness) 
does not Granger cause the Fed funds rate. This is why we strongly support that our 
predictive regressions do not suffer from endogeneity18 problems: because the 
information from the commodity derivative market is not taken into consideration by 
 
18 With the term endogeneity, we do not refer to the endogeneity problem in the pure econometric point 
of view, since we cannot have pure bidirectional causality in forecasting regressions between current 
(dependent) and lagged (independent) variables. We are referring to the absence of a causal relationship 
between our predictors of the Fed funds rate and of the Fed funds rate subsequently observed. When for 
example the inflation level rises, then the US monetary authority raises the Fed funds rate 
(contractionary policy) as a response in order to control these inflationary pressures. This does not mean 
that the inflation level can be used as indicator of monetary policy since its ‘predictive’ power lies in the 
causal relationship between current inflation and the future policy actions which are used to control it. 
This ‘partial’ endogeneity problem is absent from our forecasting models. Our option-implied predictors 
of the monetary policy stance do not cause the change of the Fed funds rate since the monetary 
authority does not respond (at least for the time-being) to changes in the option-implied uncertainty and 
risk aversion of commodity markets.  
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central banks.19 The high adjusted R2 values of our forecasting models show that the 
option-implied expectations of agricultural markets are strongly affected by (and 
hence successfully signal and anticipate) the future state of the Fed funds rate and of 
other measures of monetary policy stance like expected inflation. The increased 
impact-significance of monetary shocks on the expectations in commodity markets is 
the key factor behind their tremendous forecasting ability on monetary policy and not 
any other kind of structural relationship (feedback loop) between monetary policy and 
commodity markets. This means that the information embedded in the commodity 
derivative market is useful for predicting the future short-term level of the monetary 
policy stance.  
 
In addition, the regression results of Table 8 show that option-implied moments are 
robust predictors of monetary policy for both short and long-term forecasting horizons. 
For example, we get statistically significant coefficients of the lagged option-implied 
variance and skewness even when we forecast monetary policy 12 and 24 months 
ahead, with the R2 values remaining as high as those of the short-term horizon 
forecasting regressions. When for example we forecast the monetary policy using 
maize option-implied variance and skewness, we find that R2 values range from 26.9% 
(when we forecast the monetary policy 1 month ahead) to 20% (when we forecast the 
monetary policy 24 months ahead). This means that the forecasting power of 
commodity option-markets only slightly deteriorates when we decide to lengthen the 
forecasting horizon. In other words, we empirically verify that commodity option 
markets correctly anticipate and, according to Woodford (1994) they are valuable 
 
19 Woodford (1994) supports the view that the indicators of monetary policy which enter in a 
statistically significant way into predictive regressions are not so significant after all, if they have 
already become a policy objective. In case an economic or financial variable is not a systematic policy 
target of monetary authorities and enters significantly into forecasting regressions of the monetary 
policy stance (like the Fed funds rate), then it can act as a monetary policy indicator. 
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“non-standard indicators” of the monetary policy stance since they enter significantly 
into all of our forecasting regression models. The long-run forecasting power of the 
option-implied expectations of commodity markets on monetary policy is closely in 
line with the recent empirical findings of Fernandez-Perez, Fuertes, and Miffre (2016) 
according to which the expectations for commodity futures prices (being quantified by 
backwardation and contango commodity market portfolios) are significant indicators 
of economic activity and for changes in investment opportunities especially for long-
term forecasting horizons. 
 
Furthermore, in order to check for the robustness of the goodness-of-fit of our 
forecasting regression models, we make out-of-sample forecasts for the period t+h 
(where h is the forecasting horizon) using available data up to month t. We use an 
initial time series window of 60 months and run the regression in order to forecast the 
t+h Fed funds rate. The estimation window is then extended by one monthly period in 
order to obtain a new out-of-sample forecast. We run the same forecasting regression 
models described in tables 8 and 9 in which we make dynamic out-of-sample forecasts 
and compute the respective out-of-sample R2 values. The out-of-sample R2 values are 
given in the table 10 below. 
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
Our out-of-sample forecasting evidence shows that the predictive power of the risk 
neutral moments remains practically unaffected for the short and medium-term 
forecasting horizon (for one up to six months ahead). For example, when using the 
wheat implied variance (IV) and implied skewness (IS) as predictors of the Fed funds 
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rate in our out-of-sample forecasts, we get adjusted R2 of 40.8%, 32.6% and 21.7% for 
the one month, three month and six month forecasting horizon respectively, versus 
44.6%, 43.8% and 45% of the respective in-sample adjusted R2 values. On the other 
hand, the out-of-sample forecasting power of our option-implied risk measures 
significantly deteriorates for long-term forecasting horizons.  
 
4. Robustness  
4.1 Robustness in SVAR modeling  
In this section we conduct a series of robustness tests to test further the validity of the 
results presented in the previous sections. Our robustness checks along with the 
relevant results can be found in our Appendix. More specifically, in section A of our 
Appendix we present the results of our SVAR models when we use some alternative 
measures (proxies) for the monetary policy stance like the 3-month US Treasury Bill 
rate, the short-term real interest rate and the state of short-term inflation expectations. 
We show that when using these alternative widely accepted measures of monetary 
policy in our SVAR analysis, our empirical results and findings are unaltered. In 
section B of the Appendix, we provide the results of our SVAR analysis when using 
the pre-2008 period (the 1990-2007) period as our time series data sample. By this 
way, we implicitly control for the increased persistence of the Fed funds rate in the 
post-2008 period during which the Fed funds rate reached and stayed close to its zero 
lower bound. Again, our results do not differentiate when the increased persistence of 
the Fed fund rate process is removed from our SVAR analysis. In section C we follow 
the empirical approach of Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) and estimate a 5-
factor VAR model in which we decompose the risk neutral variance into economic 
uncertainty and risk aversion. Our results indicate that the risk aversion and not the 
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uncertainty component of the risk neutral variance is the one which has the more 
instant and significant response to monetary policy shocks.  
 
4.2 Robustness in the forecasting regression models 
We additionally provide robustness to the results of our OLS forecasting regression 
models on monetary policy. More specifically, in section D of the Appendix we run 
the regression models which are presented in section 3.4 using alternative measures of 
the monetary policy stance and show that the forecasting power of the option-implied 
moments on monetary policy remains robust to the inclusion of alternative monetary 
policy measures. In section E we control for the persistence of the Fed funds rate and 
in sections F we run our forecasting models during normal (1990-2007) and during the 
zero lower bound (post-2008) period. In all these alternative estimations of our 
forecasting models, the coefficients of the risk neutral moments remain negative and 
statistically significant. These results provide robustness to our initial findings, since 
we show that the risk neutral expectations of agricultural commodity markets give 
statistically significant and reliable forecasts for the monetary policy stance 
irrespective of the increased persistence and of the zero-lower bound of short-term US 
interest rate environment. Lastly, in section G of the Appendix we empirically show 
the absence of significant seasonalities in the agricultural risk neutral moments. This 
result provides further robustness to our empirical findings, since we show that the 
time variation of the agricultural risk neutral moments is not being driven by seasonal 







In this paper we examine the dynamic links between option-implied expectations in 
agricultural commodity markets and monetary policy. We find that a lax monetary 
policy has a significant positive effect in implied variance and implied skewness in the 
maize, wheat and soybeans derivative markets. The impact of monetary shocks on 
implied skewness is much greater compared to the impact on implied variance. Our 
empirical results are in sharp contrast to those obtained by Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005) and Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) who find that an expansionary 
monetary policy reduces uncertainty in equity markets.  Commodity investors revise 
upwards their expectations about volatility risk after observing a negative interest rate 
shock (expansionary policy), while equity investors revise downwards their 
expectations about volatility risk after observing the same shock. Our empirical 
findings are the first to show the opposite reaction of the expectations in agricultural 
commodity markets (compared to the reaction of the stock-market) to monetary policy 
shocks. The reactions of the option-implied expectations in agricultural markets are 
quite similar in terms of timing and magnitude. The policy implication behind this 
empirical results is that the monetary policy-maker (when lowering the interest rates) 
faces a trade-off between calming down the uncertainty and risk aversion in equity and 
agricultural commodity markets. The impact of monetary shocks to the risk aversion 
and to expectations in the rest commodity markets (e.g. the mineral and the energy 
commodity markets) remains unknown and is a fruitful area for further research. In 
addition, while we show that the option-implied kurtosis does not systematically 
respond to monetary policy shocks, we leave for further research the examination of 
dynamic interactions between monetary policy and other tail risk measures which 
quantify commodity investors’ perceptions about jump tail risk. We also provide 
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empirical evidence showing the robust forecasting power of implied variance and 
skewness on monetary policy with R2 values reaching almost 52%. Following 
Woodford (1994), these option-implied moments could be used as “non-standard 
indicators” of the monetary policy stance. Consequently, we leave the empirical 
examination of the forecasting power of the option-implied risk neutral moments of 
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Table 1:  Maize-Wheat-Soybeans Descriptive Statistics   
This table shows descriptive statistics of Realized Variance (RV), Implied Variance (IV) and Implied 
Skewness (IS). The data have a monthly frequency. The table presents also the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and the Philips-Perron (PP) test statistics for each one of the variables. In each test the null 
hypothesis is that the time series variable has a unit root. Lags in ADF tests are chosen by the Swartz 
information criterion. The sample period for maize, wheat and soybeans data is from January 1990 to 
December 2011. 
                                                           
Maize 
 RV IV IS 
Mean 0.064 0.069 -0.104 
Median 0.043 0.054 0.065 
Maximum 0.365 0.237 1.071 
Minimum 0.004 0.015 -2.214 
Stand. Dev 0.058 0.044 0.632 
Skewness 2.410 1.260 -1.206 
Kurtosis 10.937 4.569 4.086 
ADF test -5.933 -4.677 -2.091 
PP test -10.410 -6.131 -8.748 
Wheat 
 RV IV IS 
Mean 0.075 0.073 0.018 
Median 0.059 0.057 0.091 
Maximum 0.324 0.348 0.820 
Minimum 0.008 0.014 -2.305 
Stand. Dev 0.057 0.051 0.423 
Skewness 1.887 2.117 -1.957 
Kurtosis 6.963 9.098 10.135 
ADF test -2.965 -1.985 -3.222 
PP test -9.063 -4.870 -8.405 
Soybeans 
 RV IV IS 
Mean 0.053 0.069 0.029 
Median 0.037 0.048 0.124 
Maximum 0.277 0.403 1.299 
Minimum 0.003 0.011 -2.53 
Stand. Dev 0.047 0.060 0.615 
Skewness 2.334 2.639 -1.431 
Kurtosis 9.1480 12.488 6.2581 
ADF test -6.335 -2.820 -6.638 








Table 2: Correlation matrix for option-implied moments 
This table shows the correlation matrix with the respective correlation coefficients between the option-
implied risk neutral variance and skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans markets. The sample period 
for maize, wheat and soybeans data is from January 1990 to December 2011. 
 
  
 Maize IV Wheat IV Soybeans IV Maize IS Wheat IS  Soybeans IS 
Maize IV 1.00      
Wheat IV 0.77 1.00     
Soybeans IV 0.78 0.82 1.00    
Maize IS 0.41 0.27 0.29 1.00   
Wheat IS 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.65 1.00  










































Table 3: Granger causality tests between monetary policy and option-implied moments 
This table shows the results of the Granger causality tests between monetary policy and option-implied 
variance and skewness of commodity markets under investigation. The tests refer to the bivariate VAR 
models which include the Fed funds rate and option-implied variance and the Fed funds rate and option-
implied skewness ([FFR IV], [FFR IS]). The optimal lag-length in these bivariate VAR models has been 
chosen using the Akaike criterion. The null hypothesis is that the Independent variable does not Granger 
cause the Dependent variable. With * , ** and *** we reject the null hypothesis of no causality at the 




Dependent variable Independent variable chi-square p-value 
Fed funds rate** Maize implied variance 22.37 0.033 
Fed funds rate*** Wheat implied variance 23.06 0.002 
Fed funds rate** Soybeans implied variance 12.56 0.013 
Fed funds rate Maize implied skewness 11.47 0.488 
Fed funds rate Wheat implied skewness 14.99 0.183 
Fed funds rate Soybeans implied skewness 5.05 0.653 
Maize implied variance*** Fed funds rate 30.31 0.002 
Wheat implied variance Fed funds rate 9.95 0.191 
Soybeans implied variance Fed funds rate 5.14 0.273 
Maize implied skewness* Fed funds rate 19.46 0.078 
Wheat implied skewness*** Fed funds rate 27.07 0.005 




























Table 4. Statistical significance of IRFs between monetary policy and implied 
variance/implied skewness (bivariate SVAR model) 
This table summarizes the results of bivariate structural and reduced-form VARs with endogenous 
variables the Fed funds rate (FFR) and the risk neutral implied variance (IV) in Panel A and the Fed 
funds rate (FFR) and implied skewness (IS) in Panel B. We present how many months the Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs) generated by a negative shock in FFR or a positive shock in IV/IS remain 
statistically significant within the 95% confidence interval. We compute the Bootstrapped standard 
errors of the estimated IRFs using 1000 replications. The column "sign" indicates the sign of the 
statistically significant IRFs. 
Panel A 
 Impulse MP, response Maize IV Impulse Maize IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 8-25 - 30-42 
-structural short-run + 7, 8-10  -- 
-structural long-run + 3, 7-8, 10-25 - 38-58 
 Impulse MP, response Wheat IV Impulse Wheat IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 1-3 - 20-41 
-structural short-run + 1, 3  -- 
-structural long-run + 3 - 19-44 
 Impulse MP, response Soybeans IV Impulse Soybeans IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced form + 4-15  9-21 
-structural short-run + 4-5, 7-14  -- 
-structural long-run + -- - 4-39 
Panel B 
 Impulse MP, response Maize IS Impulse Maize IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 6-35  -- 
-structural short-run + 7, 10, 19-23  -- 
-structural long-run +  7, 10, 18-22  -- 
 Impulse MP, response Wheat IS Impulse Wheat IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 4-40  -- 
-structural short-run + 2-5, 7, 9-28 + 2-3 
-structural long-run + 20-25  -- 
 Impulse MP, response Soybeans IS Impulse Soybeans IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 8-33  -- 
-structural short-run + 6-32  -- 
-structural long-run + 6-10, 18-34 - 1-31 
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Table 5. Statistical significance of IRFs between monetary policy and implied 
variance/implied skewness (3-factor SVAR model) 
This table summarizes the results of 3-factor SVAR model with endogenous variables the Fed funds 
rate (FFR), the risk neutral variance (IV) and the risk neutral skewness (IS). We present how many 
months the IRFs generated by a negative shock in FFR or a positive shock in IV/IS remain statistically 
significant within the 95% confidence interval. The IRFs of the IV-FFR and IS-FFR pair are given in 
Panels A and B respectively. We compute the Bootstrapped standard errors of the estimated IRFs using 
1000 replications. The column "sign" indicates the sign of the statistically significant IRFs. 
 
Panel A 
 Impulse MP, response Maize IV Impulse Maize IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 3, 9-10, 12 + 2-3 
-structural short-run + 3, 7, 9-10, 21  - 
-structural long-run + 3, 7, 9-10, 18-19, 21  - 
 Impulse MP, response Wheat IV Impulse Wheat IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 1, 4-14 - 1, 16-32 
-structural short-run + 2, 4-9  - 
-structural long-run  - - 21-58 
 Impulse MP, response Soybeans IV Impulse Soybeans IV, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced form + 8-10, 18  - 
-structural short-run + 8-10  - 
-structural long-run + 7-10, 18  - 
Panel B 
 Impulse MP, response Maize IS Impulse Maize IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 4, 7-11, 13, 18-23, 25, 33 - 43-57 
-structural short-run + 4, 7-11, 17-23, 31-33  - 
-structural long-run + 7, 9-11, 16, 18-22  - 
 Impulse MP, response Wheat IS Impulse Wheat IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 5-33 + 1 
-structural short-run + 6-31  - 
-structural long-run + 11-39 - 1-36 
 Impulse MP, response Soybeans IS Impulse Soybeans IS, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form + 5-7, 9, 15, 18-22  - 
-structural short-run + 5-7, 9, 15, 18-22, 30-34  - 
-structural long-run + 5-7, 9, 18-22, 30-34 - 5-34 
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Table 6. Statistical significance of IRFs between monetary policy and option-implied 
expectations of commodity markets (4-factor VAR model) 
This table summarizes the results for the IRFs between monetary policy and option-implied 
expectations when we estimate a 4-factor VAR model presented in section 3.3. These IRFs are 
estimated for our 4-factor reduced-form VAR models with endogenous variables the monthly level of 
the Fed funds rate (FFR), the growth of the Industrial Production Index (IPI), the implied variance (IV) 
and the implied skewness (IS) of maize, wheat and soybeans markets. We present the IRFs of 
commodity markets to a negative monetary shock and the IRFs of monetary policy to a positive shock 
in commodity markets. More specifically, we present how many months the Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs) remain statistically significant within the 95% Bootstrapped confidence interval. Thus, 
we estimate for the three commodity markets a multivariate VAR model of the form: Y1 = [FFR IPI IV 
IS]. We compute the Bootstrapped standard errors of the estimated IRFs using 1000 replications. Panel 
A shows the results for the IRFs for the implied variance (IV)-monetary policy (Fed funds rate) pair and 
Panel B shows the results for the IRFs for the implied skewness (IS)-monetary policy (Fed funds rate) 
pair for maize, wheat and soybeans markets. The column "sign" indicates the sign of the statistically 
significant IRFs. 
Panel A 
  Impulse FFR- Response  IV  Impulse IV, response FFR 
  sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
-Maize  + 7-11 - 29-36 
-Wheat  + 1-9 - 24-45 
-Soybeans  + 3-18 - 24-34 
Panel B 
  Impulse FFR- Response IS  Impulse IS, response FFR 
  sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
-Maize  + 8-11  - 
-Wheat  + 4-31  - 



















Table 7. Statistical significance of IRFs between monetary policy and implied kurtosis 
This table summarizes the results of bivariate structural and reduced-form VARs with endogenous 
variables the Fed funds rate (FFR) and the risk neutral implied kurtosis (IK). We present how many 
months the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) generated by a negative shock in FFR or a positive 
shock in IK remain statistically significant within the 95% confidence interval. We compute the 
Bootstrapped standard errors of the estimated IRFs using 1000 replications. The column "sign" indicates 
the sign of the statistically significant IRFs. For the case of the IRF of the risk neutral kurtosis of the 
maize and soybeans market, we include two lines for the responses of the long-run SVAR model, since 




 Impulse MP, response Maize IK Impulse Maize IK, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form - 6-11, 18-23, 31-34 + 36-60 
-structural short-run - 6-11, 13, 18-22, 31-33  - 
-structural long-run (-) - 6-10, 18-21  - 
-structural long-run (+) + 1-2, 12, 14, 26 + 26-49 
 Impulse MP, response Wheat IK Impulse Wheat IK, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced-form - 7 + 39-56 
-structural short-run - 16-20  - 
-structural long-run  -  - 
 Impulse MP, response Soybeans IK Impulse Soybeans IK, response MP 
 sign significant from-to (month) sign significant from-to (month) 
Fed Fund Rate     
-reduced form - 9-11 + 36-60 
-structural short-run - 9-11, 21-23, 44-45  - 
-structural long-run (-) - 9  - 


















Table 8: Forecasting monetary policy (Fed funds rate) with option-implied variance and 
skewness for long and short-term forecasting horizons 
This table shows time-series regressions on monthly monetary policy stance (Fed funds rate), using as 
explanatory variables lagged values of option-implied variance and skewness for maize, wheat and 
soybeans futures respectively. In Panels A, B, C we run our predictive regressions on the Fed funds rate 
(FFR) using lagged values of maize, wheat and soybeans option-implied variance and skewness 
respectively. Our forecasting horizon ranges from 1 to 24 months. IV is option-implied variance, IS 
option-implied skewness and FFR is the Fed funds rate. The t-statistics reported in the relevant columns 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. We 
forecast the future monetary policy stance k months ahead (k=1, 3, 6, 12, 24) according to the following 
regression model: 
 
0 1 2t t k t k tFFR b b IV b IS − −= + + +  
 
A: Maize 
Horizon (k) bo t-stat(b0) b1 t-stat(b1) b2 t-stat(b2) % Adj. R2  
1m 0.048 11.34 -0.191 -3.368 -0.008 -2.873 26.9 
3m 0.048 11.33 -0.193 -3.717 -0.008 -2.699 27.4 
6m 0.048 11.39 -0.197 -3.848 -0.007 -2.435 29.1 
12m 0.047 11.03 -0.200 -3.930 -0.004 -1.437 26.2 






Horizon (k) bo t-stat(b0) b1 t-stat(b1) b2 t-stat(b2) % Adj. R2  
1m 0.049 14.02 -0.175 -4.051 -0.024 -6.405 44.6 
3m 0.049 14.24 -0.183 -4.567 -0.021 -5.386 43.8 
6m 0.050 15.58 -0.202 -6.509 -0.018 -4.565 45.0 
12m 0.049 14.88 -0.212 -7.163 -0.011 -2.623 39.3 






Horizon (k) bo t-stat(b0) b1 t-stat(b1) b2 t-stat(b2) % Adj. R2  
1m 0.047 14.37 -0.167 -4.135 -0.010 -3.981 33.9 
3m 0.047 14.77 -0.173 -5.261 -0.010 -4.313 35.1 
6m 0.047 15.00 -0.179 -6.283 -0.008 -3.980 36.0 
12m 0.045 14.41 -0.170 -6.408 -0.004 -2.472 30.8 








Table 9: Forecasting monetary policy (Fed funds rate) with option-implied variance and 
skewness when controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals and stock-market risk 
aversion 
This table shows time-series regressions on monthly Fed funds rate (FFR), using as explanatory 
variables lagged values of option-implied variance and skewness for maize, wheat and soybeans futures 
respectively while controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals and stock-market uncertainty. In Panel 
A we run our predictive regressions on the FFR one month ahead while in panel B we present the 
regression results when we run the same predictive regressions using a 3-month forecasting horizon. IV 
is option-implied variance, IS is option-implied skewness, I is the yearly overlapping inflation rate for 
each month, IPI is the yearly return in the industrial production index, SLOPE is the yield difference 
between the 10-year US-government bond and the 3-month US-TBill and VIX is the logarithm of the 
VIX index. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6t t k t k t k t k t k t k tFFR b b IV b IS bVIX b I b IPI b SLOPE − − − − − −= + + + + + + +  
Panel A:  k=1 
  Maize  Wheat  Soybeans 
Constant Coef. 0.067  0.065  0.063 
 t-stat (3.949)  (4.662)  (3.951) 
Implied Variance Coef. -0.139  -0.156  -0.130 
 t-stat (-2.894)  (-4.607)  (-5.042) 
Implied Skewness Coef. -0.006  -0.170  -0.006 
 t-stat (-3.260)  (-5.219)  (-3.696) 
VIX index Coef. -0.013  -0.007  -0.013 
 t-stat (-1.208)  (-0.831)  (-1.224) 
Inflation Coef. 0.417  0.323  0.505 
 t-stat (2.802)  (2.913)  (4.090) 
Industrial Production Coef. 0.011  0.008  -0.001 
 t-stat (0.223)  (0.211)  (-0.035) 
Term spread (slope) Coef. -1.249  -1.208  -1.106 
 t-stat (-8.072)  (-9.893)  (-7.794) 
        
% R2 adjusted  62.5  73.5  65.1 
Panel B:  k=3 
  Maize  Wheat  Soybeans 
Constant Coef. 0.068  0.067  0.066 
 t-stat (4.778)  (5.803)  (4.741) 
Implied Variance Coef. -0.124  -0.149  -0.127 
 t-stat (-2.531)  (-4.634)  (-5.316) 
Implied Skewness Coef. -0.006  -0.016  -0.005 
 t-stat (-3.181)  (-4.624)  (-5.342) 
VIX index Coef. -0.015  -0.009  -0.015 
 t-stat (-1.589)  (-1.209)  (-1.528) 
Inflation Coef. 0.338  0.248  0.421 
 t-stat (2.206)  (2.227)  (3.255) 
Industrial Production Coef. 0.055  0.047  0.037 
 t-stat (1.022)  (1.144)  (0.750) 
Term spread (slope) Coef. -1.169  -1.136  -1.039 
 t-stat (-7.207)  (-8.633)  (-7.090) 
        





Table 10: Forecasting monetary policy (goodness of fit of out-of-sample forecasts) 
This table shows the out-of-sample adjusted R2 values (in percentages) of our time series regressions on 
the monetary policy stance. More specifically, we compute the out-of-sample adjusted R2 by estimating 
dynamic out-of-sample forecasts using an initial 60-month time series window. We run time-series 
regressions on monthly Fed funds rate (FFR), using as explanatory variables lagged values of option-
implied variance and skewness for maize, wheat and soybeans futures respectively. In Panel A we 
present the out-of-sample adjusted R2 values when using the risk neutral variance and skewness as 
predictors of the Fed funds rate, while in Panel B we present the respective out-of-sample adjusted R2 
values when controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals and stock-market uncertainty. IV is option-
implied variance, IS is option-implied skewness, I is the yearly overlapping inflation rate for each 
month, IPI is the yearly return in the industrial production index, SLOPE is the yield difference between 
the 10-year US-government bond and the 3-month US-TBill and VIX is the logarithm of the VIX index. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the 




0 1 2t t k t k tFFR b b IV b IS − −= + + +  
 
Horizon (k) Maize Wheat Soybeans 
1m 19.3 40.8 23.1 
3m 12.5 32.6 19.7 
6m 4.8 21.7 12.1 
12m -14.1 -14.8 -14.8 








0 1 2 3 4 5 6t t k t k t k t k t k t k tFFR b b IV b IS bVIX b I b IPI b SLOPE − − − − − −= + + + + + + +  
 
Horizon (k) Maize Wheat Soybeans 
1m 51.1 66.2 54.5 
3m 43.5 58.9 46.3 
6m 31.0 44.9 27.3 
12m -2.4 -3.5 -10.6 














Figure 1. Contemporaneous movements of the Fed funds rate and implied skewness 
This graph plots the contemporaneous time series movements of the time series of maize, wheat and 
soybeans option-implied skewness and the Fed funds rate. The data cover the period from January 1990 




Figure 2. Contemporaneous movements of the Fed funds rate and implied variance 
This graph plots the contemporaneous time series movements of the time series of maize, wheat and 
soybeans option-implied variance and the Fed funds rate. The data cover the period from January 1990 




Figure 3.  Reduced form Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) between monetary policy (Fed funds rate) and implied variance   
This graph shows the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the bivariate structural VARs of the form Yt=[FFRt IVt], where FFR is the monthly Fed funds rate and IV is the monthly 
implied variance of maize, wheat and soybeans markets, respectively. Panel A shows the responses of implied variance to a negative one standard deviation shock to the Fed funds rate, 
while Panel B shows the responses of the Fed funds rate to a positive shock implied variance of agricultural commodity markets. Both the IRFs of the FFR and the implied variance 
(IV) of agricultural markets are expressed in percentages (divided by 100). The left column of each Panel shows the responses of the models with the short-run restriction while the 
right column shows the responses of the models with the long-run restriction. The dashed lines show the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4.   Reduced from Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) between monetary policy (Fed funds rate) and the implied skewness 
This graph shows the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the bivariate structural VARs of the form Yt=[FFRt ISt], where FFR is the monthly Fed funds rate and IS is the monthly 
implied skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans markets, respectively. Panel A shows the responses of implied skewness to a negative one standard deviation shock to the Fed funds 
rate, while Panel B shows the responses of the Fed funds rate to a positive shock to implied skewness. The IRFs of FFR presented in Panel B are expressed in percentages (divided by 
100), while for the impulse responses of implied skewness (IS) it was not necessary to do an analogous transformation. The dashed lines show the 95% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. The left column of each panel shows the responses of the models with the short-run restriction while the right column shows the responses of the models with the long-run 
restriction. 
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                    Short-run restriction                          Long-run restriction 
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Figure 5.  Structural form Impulse Response Functions (SIRFs) between monetary policy (Fed funds rate) and implied variance   
This graph shows the Structural Impulse Response Functions (SIRFs) of the bivariate structural VARs of the form Yt=[FFRt IVt], where FFR is the monthly Fed funds rate and IV is the 
monthly implied variance of maize, wheat and soybeans markets, respectively. Panel A shows the responses of implied variance to a negative one standard deviation shock to the Fed 
funds rate, while Panel B shows the responses of the Fed funds rate to a positive shock implied variance of agricultural commodity markets. The left column of each Panel shows the 
responses of the models with the short-run restriction while the right column shows the responses of the models with the long-run restriction. The dashed lines show the 95% 
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Figure 6.   Structural form Impulse Response Functions (SIRFs) between monetary policy (Fed funds rate) and the implied skewness 
This graph shows the Structural Impulse Response Functions (SIRFs) of the bivariate structural VARs of the form Yt=[FFRt ISt], where FFR is the monthly Fed funds rate and IS is the 
monthly implied skewness of maize, wheat and soybeans markets, respectively. Panel A shows the responses of implied skewness to a negative one standard deviation shock to the Fed 
funds rate, while Panel B shows the responses of the Fed funds rate to a positive shock to implied skewness. The dashed lines show the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The left 
column of each panel shows the responses of the models with the short-run restriction while the right column shows the responses of the models with the long-run restriction. 
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